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Start the Evolution without Us
Author(s): Duncan S.A. Bell, Paul K. MacDonald, Bradley A. Thayer
Source: International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer, 2001), pp. 187-198
Published by: The MIT Press
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International Security.
Correspondence
Duncan
S.A.Bell
PaulK.MacDonald
Start
the Evolution without Us
Bradley
A.
Thayer
Tothe Editors:
In
his
provocative
article
"Bringing
in Darwin:
Evolutionary Theory,
Realism,
and In-
ternational
Politics,"
Bradley Thayer appropriates arguments
from
sociobiology
to
pro-
vide a scientific basis for realist
international relations
theory,
and in so
doing
he
follows a recent trend
in the
social sciences.1
Thayer's argument
is
straightforward.
First,
traditional realist microfoundations are
dependent
on
unacceptably "metaphysi-
cal" or
"theological" assumptions
about human nature
(pp.
126-130).
Second,
findings
in
sociobiology
about human nature
provide
transhistorical, universal,
and
sufficiently
robust foundations for realist claims about international
politics (pp.
131-138).
We welcome
Thayer's
contribution to this
debate,
but we
dispute
both his
specific
formulation of
sociobiology
and the
general project
of
explaining political phenomenon
through
biological
theories.
First,
we
disagree
that
evolutionary theory
"offers a
widely
accepted
scientific
explanation"
of human behavior
(p.
138). Instead,
we
argue
that
sociobiology
remains the
object
of considerable scientific and ethical
controversy,
and
that
sociobiological approaches
contain numerous
methodological
flaws.
Second,
we
contend that even if
sociobiology
could overcome its inherent
limitations,
the
microfoundations
that a
sociobiologically
informed
theory
of
international
politics pro-
duces are
indeterminate
and
contradictory.
For this
reason,
sociobiological
microfoun-
dations
provide
no additional
analytical leverage
in
explaining
and
understanding
in-
ternational
politics. Finally,
we contend that current microfoundations
in
the social sci-
ences,
including
structural realist and rational actor
approaches,
can be
just
as
"scientific" from the
perspective
of
philosophy
of science without
importing
sociobio-
Duncan S.A. Bell is a doctoralcandidateat the Center
for
International
Studies,
CambridgeUniversity.
He
spent
the
past
academic
year
as a
Fulbright
Scholarin the
Departmentof
Political
Science,
ColumbiaUni-
versity.
Paul K. MacDonald is a doctoralcandidatein the
Departmentof
Political
Science,
ColumbiaUni-
versity. They
would like to thank Stacie
Goddard,
Robert
Jervis, Philip
Kitcher,
Daniel
Nexon,
Joseph
Parent,
JackSnyder,
and
JenniferSterling-Folkerfor
their
helpful
comments.
Bradley
A.
Thayer
is an Assistant
Professor
in the
Department of
Political Science at the
University of
Minnesota-Duluth.
Security,
Vol.
25,
No. 2
(Fall2000),
pp.
124-151.Futurecitations
appearparen-
thetically
in the text. In international
relations,
see R. Paul Shaw and Yuwa
Wong,
"Ethnic
Mobilizationand the Seeds of Warfare:An
EvolutionaryPerspective,"
International
Studies
Quar-
terly,
Vol.
31,
No. 1
(March1987),
pp.
5-31. See also
Joseph
Lopreato
and
Timothy
Crippen,
Crisisin
Sociology:
TheNeed
for
Darwin
(New Brunswick,N.J.:Transaction,1999);
Dorothy
Nelkin,
TheDNA
Mystique:
The Gene as a Cultural Icon (New York: W.H.
Freeman, 1995);
and Andrew
Brown,
The
Darwin Wars:How
Selfish
Genes Became
Stupid
Gods (London: Simon and
Schuster,
1999).
Security,
Vol.
26,
No. 1 (Summer
2001),
pp.
187-198
? 2001
by
the Presidentand Fellowsof Harvard
College
and the MassachusettsInstituteof
Technology.
187
1.
BradleyThayer,"Bringing
in Darwin:
EvolutionaryTheory,
Realism,
and InternationalPoli-
tics,"
International
International
International
Security
26:1
|
188
logical hypotheses.
Taken
together,
these three criticisms
strongly suggest against
using sociobiology
as a
panacea
for realism or for international relations
theory
in
general.
SOCIOBIOLOGYAS A CONTESTED SCIENCE
Thayer
advocates the
adoption
of
sociobiological reasoning
to
augment
the traditional
realist account of human behavior because
sociobiology
"offers a firm intellectual foun-
dation"
(p. 126)
and a "sound scientific substructure"
(p. 127)
for
understanding
the ul-
timate causes of
egoistic
and
dominating
behavior
by
human
beings.
He
implies
that
sociobiology,
which can be
broadly
defined as the
application
of
evolutionary theory
to
explain
the
genetic
foundations
of an
organism's
social
behavior,2
is
generally accepted
as an
unproblematic approach
within the
scientific
community
and
that
the
extrapola-
tion of
findings
from
sociobiological
theories into
the
realm of human behavior is also
widely regarded
as
legitimate.
Neither of these claims can be
upheld:
The science of
sociobiology
is the
subject
of
great controversy
within
biology
as well as other
cognate
disciplines.3
Indeed,
given
the torrent of scientific criticism since the
publication
of
Edward 0. Wilson's
Sociobiology:
The New
Synthesis,4Thayer's
failure to mention the
ethically
and
scientifically
contested nature of
sociobiology
is
surprising.
Some advocates of
sociobiology portray
their
opponents
as motivated
primarily by
political
correctness. We
believe, however,
that there are serious ethical issues at stake in
the
attempt
to reduce
complex
social and
political
behavior to essential elements of hu-
man
genetics.
When
accepted
uncritically, sociobiological
claims contain the
potential
to be utilized in the naturalization of behaviors that are variable and in the
justification
of
discriminatory sociopolitical
orders.5 For this
reason,
sociobiological
theories should
be held
to a
high
standard of intellectual and
analytical scrutiny
before
they
are
adopted
as scientific
fact,
or be avoided
altogether.
Given these
concerns,
international
relations theorists should
seriously
consider the
methodological
criticisms leveled
against sociobiology.
We
briefly highlight
three of the most salient of these criticisms.
2.
Sociobiology
is distinct from social science
approaches
that
employ biological metaphors
or
analogies.
See
George
Modelski and Kazimierz
Poznanski, eds.,
"Evolutionary
Paradigms
in the
Social Sciences," InternationalStudies
Quarterly,
Vol.
40,
No.
3
(September
1996),
pp.
315-433.
3. See Ulicia
Segerstrale, Defendersof
the Truth:TheBattle
for
Science
in the
Sociobiology
Debateand Be-
yond
(Oxford:
Oxford
University
Press, 2000),
p.
225. See also Arthur
L.
Kaplan,
ed.,
The
Sociobiology
Debate:
Readings
on Ethicaland
Scientific
Issues (New York:
Harper
and Row, 1978); Ken-
neth
Bock,
Human Nature and
History:
A
Response
to
Sociobiology
(New York: Columbia
University
Press, 1980);
Philip
Kitcher,
Vaulting
Ambition:
Sociobiology
and the
Quest
for
Human Nature (Cam-
bridge,
Mass.: MIT
Press, 1985);
Marshall
Sahlins,
The Use and Abuse
of Biology:
An
Anthropological
Critique
of Sociobiology
(Ann
Arbor:
University
of
Michigan
Press, 1978);
and Richard C. Lewontin
and Steven
Rose,
Not in Our Genes:
Biology,Ideology,
and Human Nature
(London:
Penguin,
1984).
4. Edward
O. Wilson,
Sociobiology:
The New
Synthesis (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard
University
Press, 1975).
For Wilson's own accounts of these
debates,
see Naturalist
(Washington,
D.C.: Island
Press, 1994),
pp.
305-353.
5. See Elizabeth Allen et
al.,
"Against 'Sociobiology,"'
New YorkReview
of
Books, November 13,
1975,
pp.
182-186;
Richard C.
Lewontin,
Biology
as
Ideology
(New York:
HarperCollins,
1991);
Rich-
ard M.
Lerner,
Final Solutions:
Biology,Prejudice,
and Genocide
(University
Park:
Pennsylvania
State
University
Press, 1992);
Jonathan Beckwith,
"The Political Use of
Sociobiology
in the United States
and
Europe,"
Philosophical
Forum,
Vol.
13,
No. 2
(Winter 1981-1982),
pp.
311-321;
and Lewontin
and
Rose,
Not in Our Genes.
Correspondence
189
First,
the
universality
of the
sociobiological project-and specifically
its
applicability
to the
study
of human behavior-is
extremely
controversial.
Thayer downplays
the se-
rious
disagreements by claiming
that the
study
of humans is central to the sociobio-
logical project (p.
130).
In
contrast,
one commentator
has noted that "most 'sociobiolo-
gists'
. .
. are
quite
uninterested
in
humans."6
In
particular, many biologists
themselves
dispute
the
applicability
of
sociobiological approaches
to
humans
because of the
central
role of
culture,
language,
and
self-reflexivity
in
determining
human behavior.7
Al-
though
advocates of human
sociobiology acknowledge
the dual influences of culture
and
genetics
in
shaping
human
behavior,
no consensus exists on how to
explain
the
complex interplay
between these factors.
Second,
sociobiological explanations
of human behavior are often
unacceptably
func-
tionalist.
Sociobiologists
take a
particular
form of human behavior and account for it
with reference to
evolutionary
fitness. Different
sociobiologists
explain
behaviors
rang-
ing
from selfishness to altruism and from
monogamy
to
rape
based on the claim that
they
confer a selective
advantage
to the individuals or
groups
who
practice
them.
The
quality
of
sociobiological explanations
and the models used to demonstrate
them
vary tremendously,
but such
arguments generally
fall into the
trap
of what Rich-
ard Lewontin and
Stephen Jay
Gould call
"adaptationism,"
the
attempt
to understand
all the
physiological
and behavioral traits of an
organism
as
evolutionary adaptations.8
Individual
traits
may
in fact be the
result
of
a
complex
web of
design
and
development
in the
organism's growth.
The
effects of individual
genes may
not be discernable in
isolation
from their
interaction
with
other
genetic
traits and environmental factors.
Traits
may
be
nonadaptive
and the
product
of
allometry-the
relative and incidental
growth
of a
part
of an
organism
in relation to the whole bundle of traits that constitute
an
organism.
Thus a
particular
behavior
may
be "a
consequence
of
adaptations
rather
than an
adaptation
in its own
right."9
The
complexity
and
unpredictability
of interac-
tions between individual selection
pressures
and
particular
traits create intractable
problems
for researchers
attempting
to isolate the
genetic
foundations of behavior
within
variegated
environmental and cultural contexts.
In other
words,
even if we
develop
an account of how
any given
behavior is func-
tional with reference to
evolutionary
fitness,
we are a
long way
from
being
able to con-
clude that
evolutionary
mechanisms
actually gave
rise to that behavior. In this
way,
sociobiological
accounts
easily degenerate
into
examples
of the
post
hoc,
ergo propter
hoc
fallacy
generally
associated with other versions of functionalist
explanations
in
the so-
Truth,
chap.
7.
8.
See,
for
example,
Richard C.
Lewontin,
"Sociobiology
as an
Adaptationist Program,"
Behavioral
Science,
Vol.
24,
No. 1
(1979),
pp.
5-14;
and
Stephen Jay
Gould and Richard C.
Lewontin,
"The
Spandrels
of San Marco and the
Panglossian Paradigm:
A
Critique
of the
Adaptationist
Programme," Proceedingsof
the
Royal Society of
London,
Series
B,
Vol.
205,
No. 1161
(September
21,
1979),
pp.
581-598.
9.
Philip
Kitcher,
"On the Crest of 'La
Nouvelle
Vague,"'
International Studies
Quarterly,
Vol.
31,
No. 1
(March 1987),
p.
46;
and
Kitcher,
Vaulting
Ambition,
chap.
7.
of
the
6.
Segerstrale,Defendersof
the
Truth,
p.
475
(emphasis
in
original).
7. See
Joshua
S.
Goldstein,
"The
Emperor's
New Genes:
Sociobiology
and
War,"International
Studies
Quarterly,
Vol.
31,
No. 1
(March1987),
pp.
33-45;
and
John
Maynard
Smith, "Survival
through
Suicide,"
New
Scientist,
August
28, 1975,
pp.
496-497.
See also
Segerstrale,Defenders
International
Security
26:1 190
cial
sciences.'0
This
problem
of
isolating particular genetic
traits is
compounded
within
human
populations,
which are not
generally
divided into
isolated,
distinguishable gene
pools
and
which,
as mentioned
above,
attribute a
large
role to culture
in
determining
socially acceptable
and
legitimate
behavior."
Third,
sociobiologists
themselves
disagree
over the
unit
of selection that should be
emphasized during
evolution-whether it be the
gene,
the
individual,
or the
group.12
Because different
sociobiological
studies examine selection at different
analytical
levels,
they frequently produce
different and
contradictory hypotheses
about what behaviors
should maximize fitness.
Sociobiologists
have not
systematically
examined how differ-
ent units of selection interact
analytically,
and
they disagree
as to what level exerts the
greatest degree
of influence on evolution. For
example, Maynard
Smith
argues
that if
fitness is exercised at an
aggregate
level,
then
group-level
selection
pressures
must be
sufficiently stringent
and
rapid
so that incentives to maximize individual fitness will
not
supersede
those of the
group.13
Empirically
assessing
the relative
degree
and fre-
quency
of
group
selection
pressures
vis-a-vis individual or
genetic
factors is extraordi-
narily complex,
however,
and in the
messy
world of human
political
and cultural
interaction,
this task is
practically impossible.
This
controversy
is further muddied
by disagreement
over how to
operationalize
the
theoretical
concept
of the
gene. Many biologists dispute
the
notion that
particular genes
can be understood
in
isolation,
and
emphasize
the
importance
of the interactions be-
tween
genes
in a
complete,
interconnected
genome
as well as to the environment
in
which
they
are
embedded.'4
Similarly,
others criticize the fact that
many sociobiologists
do not
actually
link
particular
behavior with an individual
gene,
but rather
rely
on
pop-
ulation
genetics
and statistical
analysis
to
identify "hypothetical" genes
that correlate
with
particular
behaviors. These critics
correctly
view the
highly stylized,
formal results
of
sociobiology
as
suspect,
because
they
are never able to control for all
possible exoge-
nous variables and
they
minimize the
importance
of controlled
experimentation.'5
and
After
(Malden,
Mass.:
Blackwell,1998).
11. Forfurtherelaborationon these
points,
see
Goldstein,
"The
Emperor's
New Genes."See also
RichardC.
Lewontin,
"The
Apportionment
of Human
Diversity,"EvolutionaryBiology,
Vol.6
(New
York:
Plenum,1972),
pp.
381-494.
12.
See
Segerstale, Defenders
of
the
Truth,
p.
72.
13. See
John
Maynard
Smith,
"Group
Selection
and Kin
Selection,"Nature,
March
14, 1964,
pp.
1145-1147.Fora
discussion,
see
Kitcher,
Vaulting
Ambition,
pp.
77-80.
14. Ernst
Mayr,
"Howto
Carry
Outthe
AdaptationistProgram,"
American
Naturalist,
Vol.
121,
No.
3
(March1983),
pp.
324-334.Forother
leadingbiologicalcritiques,
see
Lewontin,
"Sociobiology
as
an
AdaptationistProgram";
Peter
Medewar,
"Stretch
Genes,"
New YorkReview
of
Books,
July
16,
1981,
pp.
45-48;
and Gabriel
Dover,"Anti-Dawkins,"
(New
York:
Harcourt,1968),
pp.
87-101;
in
Hilary
Rose and Steven
Rose, eds., Alas,
PoorDarwin
(London:Jonathan
Cape,
2000).Dover,
p.
48,
notes that
"genes
arenot
self-replicating
units;
they
arenot
eternal;
they
are not units of
selection;
they
are not units of
function;
and
they
are not units of instruction.
They
are modularin constructionand
history;invariably
redundant;
each involved in a multitude of
functions;
and misbehave
in a bizarre
range
of
ways. They
co-
evolve
intimately
and
interactively
with
each
other
through
their
protein
and RNA
products.They
have
no
meaning
outside of their
interactions,
with
regard
to
any adaptive
featuresof an individ-
ual: thereare no one-to-onelinks between
genes
and
complex
traits."
15. See
Segerstale,Defendersof
the
Truth,
chaps.
11-14;
and
John
Maynard
Smithand N.
Warren,
"Modelsof Culturaland Genetic
Change,"
Evolution,
Vol.
36,
No. 3
(May
1982),
pp.
620-627.
SocialTheories
and
Jeffrey
C.
Alexander,
Neofunctionalism
10.
See
ArthurL.
Stinchcombe,
Constructing
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